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This article compares Japan and Southeast Asia before the Second World War to explore the question Goldsmith 
posed: why, since financial transition in all countries follows the same path, should there be such remarkable 
differences in the speed of transition?  Beginning after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 and starting from the same per 
capita income as Southeast Asian countries, Japan had, by 1913, built a modern financial system comparable to 
those in the West.  But finance in Southeast Asian countries was (and remained in 1939) little developed, dominated 
by metropolitan interests, heavily reliant on informal finance, and geared towards primary commodity exports.  The 
article argues that Southeast Asia's no more than partial financial transition is explained by a continued ability to tap 
natural resources, limited technological change, and the laissez-faire stance of colonial governments.  Japan, by 
contrast, could not depend on abundant resources for growth.  Its experience demonstrates how nationalist objectives 
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Financial Transition in Pre-World War II Japan and Southeast Asia 
 
Self-sustaining, technologically-based growth has always been accompanied by a process of 
financial transition which, as defined by Raymond Goldsmith, entails an increase in the financial 
superstructure to a status in the economy comparable to that in the leading countries of North 
America and Western Europe.
1  The pattern of development along this transitional path may, of 
course, differ, as for example in the relative contribution of bank- or market-based financial 
systems.  But all countries, Goldsmith observed, trace a similar transitional path in the increase 
in their superstructure of financial instruments and institutions relative to an infrastructure of 
output and wealth.  Because of the close relationship between financial transition and modern 
economic growth as defined by Simon Kuznets, differences in speed at which countries traverse 
Goldsmith’s transitional path are critical.  
In 1870, ‘a percipient and knowledgeable economist’ like Mill or Marx, Goldsmith 
argued, would have expected India to progress further along the path of financial transition than 
Japan.  ‘Neither Mill nor Marx would ever have envisaged the abysmal difference’ in 
transitional speeds, and therefore financial development, that over subsequent decades 
increasingly differentiated the two countries.
2  For many of the reasons that Goldsmith cited as 
relevant to the India-Japan comparison, it might also have been anticipated in 1870 that 
Southeast Asian countries would move as quickly as Japan towards financial transition. 
Japan and the six Southeast Asian countries of Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia, 
Indochina and the Philippines were all poor, overwhelmingly agrarian economies with similar 
per capita incomes and sectoral distributions of output and labour force.  Indeed, in some 
respects Southeast Asian countries might have been thought in 1870 the more likely to 
accomplish financial transition and an associated process of economic development.  The 1868 
Meiji Restoration only just completed, Japan was still politically unstable, whereas Southeast 
Asia already had, or was about to acquire, the stability and strong legal framework associated   2
with colonial rule.  Although Southeast Asian countries, as Goldsmith noted of Japan, lacked 
‘modern financial institutions’ they had, like Japan, a framework of European banks.
3  Southeast 
Asia's links with the West might have been expected to give access to capital and technology.  
While Japan had the more developed tradition of indigenous industry, Southeast Asia possessed 
a far greater abundance of natural resources.  Yet by 1913 Japan had a modern financial system 
and ranked in the same class as Western countries.  No Southeast Asian country reached a point 
comparable to Japan in 1913 until well after the Second World War. 
A large body of work considers the causal relationship between financial and economic 
development,
4 and Rajan and Zingales show how interest groups can reverse financial 
development.
5  It is suggested that major strands of causality, perhaps even the dominant ones, 
run from financial to economic development.  But the literature remains largely silent on the 
question posed by Goldsmith: why are differences in the speed at which countries move along a 
transitional path of finance so great?  Even Goldsmith, although asking that question, 
immediately concluded that:  'Needless to say, an answer will not be forthcoming'.
6
This article aims, first, to contribute to an answer to Goldsmith's question by comparing 
Southeast Asian and Japanese financial development, and, second, to increase understanding of 
Southeast Asian financial experience.
7  What might have happened in Southeast Asia, and what 
did happen, can only be fully understood through what did not happen.  That is not to say that 
Japan is a norm or model which, in some better world, Southeast Asian countries might have 
followed.  Rather it is to argue that Southeast Asian countries were, a few crucial parameters 
apart, not so different from Japan.  Identification and assessment of the relative importance of 
these parameters affords insight into the factors which govern speeds of financial transition. 
I argue that, in part, different needs for finance arose from opposite factor endowments.  
From the start a bias existed towards divergent financial development in Southeast Asia and 
Japan.  The article contends, furthermore, that political organisation and social goals are   3
fundamental in explaining the economics of transition.  In Southeast Asian countries, relatively 
undeveloped political and social structures and a lack of national identity restricted resistance to 
nineteenth-century Western expansionism.  A resulting extension of colonialism severely limited 
the possibility of financial transition.  Japan, however, was sufficiently socially and politically 
unified to respond to foreign intrusion with a strong nationalism and drive towards military 
power, industrialisation and modern finance. 
The history of financial transition in Japan is sometimes written in terms of a great-man 
theory, the great man being Count Masayoshi Matsukata.  In Southeast Asia, colonial rule 
effectively precluded the emergence of 'great men' to effect financial transition.  Even 
supposing, however, that six such individuals had existed, one for each Southeast Asian country, 
the article suggests that they would have remained in obscurity: the environment of an 
emergence of a modern state and modern economic growth which complement financial 
transition and allow great men to act was lacking. 
This article is structured in six sections.  The first considers some of the principal 
features of economic growth and development in Southeast Asia and Japan.  Four further 
sections analyze and compare Japanese and Southeast Asian experiences of financial 
development and transition.  The last section compares Southeast Asia and Japan in light of an 
analytical framework pioneered by Richard Sylla and attempts to identify the reasons for 
differing transitional speeds.
8
I. Growth and Change in Southeast Asia and Japan 
Between 1870 and the Second World War, economic growth in both Southeast Asia and Japan 
was substantial but took quite different courses.  As striking were the opposite effects on Japan 
and Southeast Asia of foreign intervention.  This section analyzes contrasting Southeast Asian 
and Japanese development patterns. 
In 1850, little of Southeast Asia, except Java, some other parts of Indonesia, and the   4
Philippines, then still ruled by Spain, was under European control.  Societies in Southeast Asia 
were, however, too traditional, too technologically backward and too fragmented to repel or 
negotiate effectively with foreigners.  By the 1880s, when Japan had fulfilled the 'politically 
essential preconditions' for transition to a modern state,
9 most of Southeast Asia was divided into 
spheres of Western influence or had fallen under colonial rule.  At the turn of the century, 
Southeast Asia was governed by four colonial powers — Britain (Burma and Malaya); the 
Netherlands (Indonesia); France (Indochina); and the United States (the Philippines).  Thailand 
(Siam), nominally independent, had quasi-colonial arrangements and a British financial advisor. 
After 1870, growth in Southeast Asia stemmed predominantly from international trade 
that afforded a 'vent' or outlet to utilize surplus land in the production of primary commodities 
which, unless exported, would not have been worth the effort of producing.   However, in parts 
of Southeast Asia, including Java, north Vietnam in Indochina, and central Luzon in the 
Philippines, dense population ruled out vent-for-surplus growth.  Prominent in the venting of 
surpluses was dependence on a few staple exports.  Burma, Thailand and Indochina all relied 
heavily on rice, the Philippines on sugar, and both Malaya and Indonesia (in its so-called Outer 
Provinces beyond the Javanese centre) on tin and rubber. 
Vent-for-surplus agricultural output in Southeast Asia divided between small farmers 
and estates, predominantly European-owned.  Before about 1910 estates had significance only in 
parts of Indonesia and the Philippines, while small Chinese enterprises produced most of 
Malaya's tin.  Subsequently, large-scale units gained in prominence.  But even in the inter-war 
years small farmers produced the bulk of Southeast Asian exports. 
In Japan, the arrival of Commodore Perry's squadron in Edo (Tokyo) Bay in 1853 and 
again in 1854 closely paralleled the timing of Western expansionism in Southeast Asia.  Japan 
was forced to open itself to trade, grant treaty port concessions, and accept 'semi-colonial' status 
until the 1880s.
10   But, despite the several similarities, Japan had initial conditions superior to   5
Southeast Asia’s.  By the mid-nineteenth century, population had for some time remained stable.  
Although some 80% of Japan’s labour force engaged in farming, Edo, Kyoto and Osaka were 
large cities.  Crafts and trade were significant activities and, more important, spread fairly evenly 
through Japan.  There was already a well developed, if traditional, financial system.
11
Japan's remarkable homogeneity of culture and language, when harnessed by the Meiji 
Restoration, powerfully promoted a 'burst of enthusiasm for national goals'.
12  'Ideas of 
modernity — progress, science, and rationality — meant a great deal to the Japanese people', 
most of whom looked to the state to initiate change.
13  The conservative oligarchy that gained 
legitimacy in Meiji Japan viewed international relations as a 'single alternative: conquer or be 
conquered'.
14  To avoid the latter required economic 'catch up' and the creation of a modern state 
like those which emerged in nineteenth-century Western Europe and the United States.
15  
Fundamental to these political and economic objectives was the development of modern 
financial institutions. 
An identification of industrialisation and financial development with nationalism and the 
military power necessary to respond to Western intrusion directed growth in Japan along a path 
different to Southeast Asia's.  So too did Japan's factor endowment of labour, not resource, 
abundance.  In 1881 population density in Japan was 271 persons per square mile compared to 
25 to 53 persons in Southeast Asian countries excepting Java.  To grow economically, Japan had 
to rely on technical change and structural transformation.  At first, the dominant force in 
Japanese growth was indigenous or so-called Meiji technology.  Between 1870 and 1900 its 
spread decisively raised agricultural productivity.
16  Silk filature and Japan's first modern 
industry, cotton goods manufacture, expanded rapidly.  Even so, in 1905 manufacturing and 
mining together comprised only 12% of Japan's GDP, compared to agriculture's 26%.
17
In the 1920s the focus of Japanese technological development moved towards heavier, 
capital intensive industry such as chemicals, iron and steel, machinery and electrical   6
equipment.
18  'Post-textile' technology was accompanied by profound structural change that 
shifted resources into faster growing sectors than agriculture and continuously afforded 
opportunities to adopt and finance new technology.  By 1939 manufacturing and mining 
accounted for 34% of GDP and agriculture for just 15%.
19
War and Imperialism had major developmental implications for both Southeast Asia and 
Japan.  For Japan, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 
were, in cost-benefit terms, among modern history's 'most effective political and economical 
military operations'
20and important both to financial development and industrialisation.  War 
indemnity from China enabled Japan to join the international gold standard in 1897 and so 
borrow in London to finance the Russo-Japanese conflict.  The consequent benefits of enhanced 
international standing and 'the possibility of exploiting China' exceeded even those of the 1894-
95 war.
21  Southeast Asian countries were, by contrast, the vanquished not the victors of late 
nineteenth-century imperial aggression. 
By 1886, Japan had begun modern economic growth.
22  To be sure, from the 1870s 
onwards Southeast Asian countries —  like Japan — acquired extensive infrastructure such as 
roads, harbours, electric power, telegraphs and telephones.  In Southeast Asia technical progress 
also occurred in tin mining, petroleum extraction, the processing of primary commodity exports 
and merchant activities.  But vent-for-surplus agricultural staples in inter-war Southeast Asia 
were grown employing much the same technologies as had been used decades previously.  The 
lack of technical change in agriculture and a failure fully to accomplish the first or 'easy' stage of 
import-substituting industrialisation mark out Southeast Asia as falling short of modern 
economic growth.
23
Existing statistics indicate that in 1870 most Southeast Asian countries stood at 
approximately the same level of GDP per capita as Japan (table 1).
24  For Southeast Asia and 
Japan during the twentieth century two available sets of per capita GDP estimates permit   7
divergent conclusions.  One set (panel a) shows that by 1913, and even more in 1929, Southeast 
Asian countries, other than Malaya at the later date, had fallen distinctly behind Japan.  These 
figures suggest that 1929 per capita income in Malaya including Singapore was about 12% less 
than in Japan.  The other, yen-based data set (panel b) indicate that in 1913 Southeast Asian 
incomes were still equal to Japan's.  These data find inter-war per capita income in Malaya well 
ahead of Japanese levels but other Southeast Asian countries considerably behind them.  The 
1930s collapse in the world economy largely ended growth in Southeast Asia, though not in 
Japan. 
II. Monetization, currency boards and central banks 
In Southeast Asia, whenever possible financial development was left to the market.  The 
Japanese government, typically looking abroad for prototypes, was instrumental in the creation 
of modern financial institutions as part of the Meiji drive to modernization.  This section, and the 
three which follow, compare Southeast Asian and Japanese financial development and raise two 
main issues concerning financial transition.  How did contrasting approaches to finance by 
governments in Southeast Asia and Japan affect transition?  And how did finance facilitate, and 
to what extent was it shaped by, divergent development paths in Southeast Asia and Japan? 
In 1870, neither Japan nor any country in Southeast Asia had a unified monetary 
standard.  At the time of the Meiji Restoration, Han (feudal clan) notes were in circulation and 
by March 1870 the government had already issued 20 proclamations to try to resolve a currency 
system described as 'chaotic'.
25  The Mexican dollar, as in Southeast Asia,  served in early Meiji 
Japan as the currency for international payments.
26
During the late nineteenth century Southeast Asia's monetary systems became 
increasingly uncertain and piecemeal due to a progressive breakdown in the silver standard, and 
so also in the use of the Mexican dollar for domestic as well as international payments.  
Southeast Asian governments were forced into regulation.  A near-universal solution was the   8
adoption of the gold-exchange standard, by Indonesia in 1891, and within seventeen years by all 
but one of the other countries: Indochina remained on silver until 1930 and had more flexible 
monetary arrangements than elsewhere in Southeast Asia.
27  The gold-exchange standard 
incorporated colonial currencies into the international gold standard by tying them, rather than 
directly to gold, to the gold-based currencies of the ruling country (for Siam, Britain) at a fixed 
exchange rate.  Because the link to gold was through the metropolitan currency, the system 
could be described variously as the sterling-, dollar- or guilder-exchange standard.
28
Southeast Asian gold-exchange standard currencies were comprehensively backed by 
foreign reserves, typically in the currency of the ruling country.  The backing was usually 110% 
in British colonies (and Siam), where colonial currency boards were established (operative in 
Siam through the Treasury) to issue local currency in exchange for equivalent foreign reserves.  
Similar backing obtained in India, of which Burma was a province until 1937, where three 
Presidency banks (from 1921-1934 the Imperial Bank of India) acted like a currency board.
29  In 
Indonesia the government gave a private bank, the Java Bank, the exclusive right to issue 
currency, subject to a high reserve backing.  The Bank safeguarded exchange rate fixity with the 
Dutch guilder through discount policy but, like currency boards, could not control Indonesia's 
domestic monetary policy.
30  The new Southeast Asian colonial currencies — under a currency 
board, or currency-board-like, system identical to metropolitan currency apart from the printing 
on the notes — quickly gained credibility.  Unified systems of money spread rapidly throughout 
the region.
31
After the Meiji Restoration a swift modernization of Japan's monetary system might 
seem a near precondition for speedy financial transition.  Instead, the establishment of the yen as 
a national currency convertible into specie was lengthy process and depended on extensive 
government involvement to build a modern banking system and stabilise the yen.  Two 
government attempts soon after the Restoration to encourage the development of a banking   9
system failed.  A major stumbling block was public distrust of paper money combined with the 
convertibility of bank notes into silver, which made it difficult to keep the paper in circulation.
32  
In its third attempt, the government imaginatively created a banking system while at the same 
time finding an alternative to the great burden on the exchequer of pensions which had been paid 
to feudal lords (daimyo, numbering less than 300) and their sumurai, or warrior, retainers.  The 
pensions had been given after an 1873 Meiji land tax replaced feudal in-kind levies on the rice 
harvest.  By 1876 the pensions had been commuted to government bonds.  The National Bank 
Act of 1876 allowed the commutation bonds to be used to capitalise banks; bank notes ceased to 
be convertible into specie, and greater profit margins for banks increased the incentive to enter 
banking.  Just four national banks existed in 1876, but by 1879 these numbered 151 and 
extended to most parts of Japan.  Samurai and the nobility, mostly ex-daimyo, held 75% of the 
stock of national banks.
33  Most deposits in the new banks were the government's.  Even at the 
end of the 1870s, however, Japan's monetary system remained unstable, fragmented, and subject 
to serious inflation. 
  Count Matsukata, appointed finance minister in 1881 and the architect of the financial 
system as it developed over the next three decades, immediately adopted strict monetarist 
orthodoxy and began a far-reaching programme of institution building.   He used the Belgian 
central bank and pre-1914 German Reichsbank as models to found the Bank of Japan in 1882.  
Between 1881 and 1885 Matsukata engineered savage money supply contraction and deflation, 
and used a sweeping privatisation of state-owned enterprises to reduce government liabilities.  
By 1886 Japan had stable public and private finance.  A network of commercial banks existed 
and the Bank of Japan began effectively to assume the functions of a central bank.  Its notes, 
convertible into specie, started to replace inconvertible paper money and by 1897 comprised 
three quarters of money supply. 
The Bank of Japan resembled the Reichsbank in its elastic issue system, which allowed   10
notes to be issued well in excess of gold reserves.  By contrast, colonial monetary arrangements 
amounted to an extreme version of the classical gold standard.  A loss in foreign reserves, for 
example arising from a slump in foreign demand and fall in the value of exports relative to 
imports, necessitated an immediate and automatic contraction in local money supply.  Monetary 
contraction reinforced the initial contraction from a decline in exports and, in the event of a 
sharp initial downturn, led to a bank liquidity crisis.
34  Unlike a central bank, currency boards, 
such as those in Southeast Asia and the Java Bank, minimise government involvement and 
cannot act as a lender of last resort to commercial banks or attempt to stabilize the economy.  
III. Banking development 
In developing countries the financial system can be described as dual if most of the economy 
relies on informal or pre-modern finance, and if this finance is largely separate from a relatively 
small modern financial sector.  A test for financial transition is the extent to which elements of 
dualism are continuously eliminated as countries develop a unified modern financial system that 
expands at the expense of informal finance.  One theme of this section is the financial dualism 
characteristic of Southeast Asia compared to Japan's progressive unification in the market for 
finance.  A second, related theme is how government can accelerate — or frustrate — financial 
transition.  The two themes of market segmentation and the role of government are discussed in 
this and in subsequent sections on long-term and rural finance. 
Japanese banking in the 1860s paralleled Southeast Asia's in that a number of major 
European (chiefly British) banks opened branches to finance foreign trade.  Thereafter, however, 
while in Southeast Asia formal finance continued to be dominated by a handful of European 
branch banks, finance rapidly evolved in Japan.  The main change in Southeast Asia was the 
emergence after 1900 of a distinct tier of local Asian banks that competed little, if at all, with 
European banks, thus preserving a clearly segmented financial structure. 
In the nationalist and modernizing climate of Meiji Japan, reliance for finance on an   11
1860s 'western banking invasion' (also prominent in Southeast Asia) and local quasi-banks, 
engaged in moneylending and a variety of financial activities, was never acceptable.
35  Instead, 
Japan's government-led development of finance centered on creating a modern banking system. 
Subsidies to develop bank finance as an infant industry came in three ways: through the right of 
national banks to issue notes at zero cost; through government deposits in national and private 
banks; and through the government's use of these banks to carry out a number of its fiscal 
activities.  After a mid-1890s withdrawal of the note-issuing privileges of national banks, the 
Bank of Japan was the sole issuer of bank notes.
36
Between 1900 and 1913 Japanese banks (now a single system of so-called ordinary 
banks after the expiration of national bank charters) evolved into true financial intermediaries: 
half of their funds came from deposits whereas in 1870 banks had mainly lent their own funds.
37  
In 1910 the five largest banks — Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda (Fuji after 1945) and 
Daiichi  — accounted for over a fifth of all commercial bank deposits.  Already alliances of all 
of the five largest banks with zaibatsu (family conglomerates) set a pattern of bank 
concentration and industrial finance important to subsequent Japanese industrialisation.
38
In Japan a development-oriented nationalism and an effective government bureaucracy 
which promoted modern finance infused financial development with a dynamism largely absent 
in Southeast Asia.  Japan's route to currency unification based on the yen might seem 
unnecessarily protracted compared to Southeast Asia's swift and successful introduction of 
unified currencies.  But Japan's approach had the strong advantages — consistent with the 
'finance-led' growth Rousseau and Sylla find for the United States and Rousseau for Japan
39 — 
of rapidly building an integrated financial network which promoted the economy's structural 
transformation from agriculture towards industry, and especially during the inter-war years to 
heavy and chemical industries.
40  Monetary flexibility of a kind impossible under colonial 
currency boards enabled the Japanese government to oversee the banking system, to mitigate   12
banking instability in the 1920s, and, through Japan's banks, to direct resources towards 
economic modernization.
41
At the turn of the century in Southeast Asia, formal finance (as in Japan just before the 
Meiji Restoration) still consisted chiefly of European branch banks.  These, characteristically 
with head offices in metropolitan countries, restricted themselves almost entirely to financing 
the region's trade with Western countries and, due to this orientation and associated currency 
dealings, became known as 'exchange banks'.  Three main British banks — the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and the 
Mercantile Bank of India — operated throughout Southeast Asia.  Even in non-British colonies 
these banks financed much of trade and exercised a degree of monopoly power.
42  Other 
exchange banks in Southeast Asia — the Banque de l'Indochine, the Java Bank, the Netherlands 
Trading Society and the National City Bank of New York  — were less international than their 
British counterparts. 
Before the Second World War, European, and especially British, banking in Southeast 
Asia ventured little beyond its nineteenth-century exchange bank origins.  Unlike Matsukata's 
planned structure of complementary finance, Southeast Asia's oligopolistic banking structure, 
within which banks remained largely unwilling to lend outside the foreign trade sector, 
circumscribed the local availability of finance for entrepreneurs.
43  European banks lent 
(typically through compradores when dealing with Chinese) to only a comparatively small 
number of important Asians.
44
Under Matsukata prominent features of Japanese banking development were functional 
specialization, government incentives to develop institutional finance and, directed by the 
government, banks’ support of one another..  Some of the so-called special banks for which he 
planned are discussed later in the context of long-term finance.  But one special bank, the 
Yokohama Specie Bank dating from 1880, is dealt with here because of the contrast with   13
Southeast Asia.  The Bank, soon an adjunct of the Bank of Japan, was a direct government 
response to the Western exchange bank monopoly in financing Japanese trade.
45  By 1911 the 
Specie Bank financed 45% of Japan's foreign trade compared to the Hongkong and Shanghai 
Bank's 30%.  The Specie Bank was afforded capital and preferential interest rates by the Bank of 
Japan and, in subsidizing export industries, became a vehicle for Japanese industrial policy.
46
After 1900, a tier of indigenous banking emerged in Southeast Asia through local Asian 
banks in major urban areas including Singapore, Penang, Rangoon, Bangkok, Saigon and 
Manila.  Unlike European banks, they were willing to lend widely to local Asian entrepreneurs 
and industrialists and tapped a different, broader market for deposits and savings than European 
banks.  In Singapore, for example, Asian banks encouraged the 'banking habit' and mobilized 
additional finance, since even in the inter-war period 'the European banks had an air about them 
which intimidated many local people ... [and] would not accept small accounts'.
47  Similarly 
attractive to local Asians were two Chinese banks established in Manila in the 1920s, while in 
Rangoon a variety of Indian and Chinese banks served the local Asian community.
48
  It was virtually certain, however, that in Southeast Asia local Asian banks would remain 
small because of colonial currency board or currency board-like systems and heavy reliance on a 
narrow range of primary commodities subject to high volatility.  Any export slump and 
consequent balance of payments deficit left the Asian banking sector highly vulnerable to 
insolvency for three reasons.  Unlike Japan, Southeast Asia had no central banks to serve as 
lender of last resort; there were rigid, not elastic, note issue systems; and Asian banks had no 
access to an external wholesale credit market.  Asian banks faced uncertainty over the timing 
and extent of export, and consequent monetary, contractions.  These, in turn, led to a cash drain 
and the danger of a liquidity crisis.  That uncertainty, and the absence of recourse to a central 
bank or a metropolitan head office like European banks, seriously curtailed the scope of Asian 
banks for lending and so their allocative role for finance.  As a response to uncertainty, Asian   14
banks normally kept at least 50% of current account deposits liquid by depositing them with 
European banks.
49
Few financial statistics exist for Southeast Asia.  But those available show two main 
differences in the pace and extent of Southeast Asian and Japanese financial transition.  First, 
monetization in Southeast Asia lagged Japan in 1913.  Nevertheless, it was well underway and 
caught up during the inter-years.  Between 1913 and 1938 throughout Southeast Asia M0 per 
capita rose rapidly, approximately doubling on average (table 2, panel a).  High M0 per capita in 
Malaya reflected a degree of economic specialization exceptional even among Southeast Asia's 
vent-for-surplus economies. 
Second, the obvious gulf between Southeast Asia and Japan was in banking 
development and so financial depth.  Since M1 differs from M0 essentially in the inclusion of 
checking account money created by the banking system as a result of deposits, the larger the 
difference between M1 and M0 the greater the scope for banks to mobilize finance for economic 
development.  Similarly, M2 adds to M1 by including time or savings deposits and so indicates a 
further increase in financial depth through the banking system's role in allocating more (and 
probably also longer-term) finance.  In Japan in 1885 the banking system still did little to 
mobilize finance: the ratios of M0/GDP and M2/GDP were almost identical.  But by 1913 the 
ratio M2/GDP was over five times that of M0/GDP and similar to the United States' ratio (table 
2, panel c).  By contrast, the small differences between M1 and M0 in Southeast Asia show the 
restricted role of banks and indicate still shallow finance.  In 1938 Southeast Asian ratios of 
demand deposits to M0 were around 0.33 to at most 1.0 compared to about 2.1 in Japan and 4.5 
in the United States (table 2, panel a).  Moreover, in 1938 M2/GDP ratios in most Southeast 
Asian countries still fell short of Japan's financial depth by 1900 (table 2, panels b and c). 
Statistics for bank assets tell much the same story as monetary data (table 3).  By 1938 
Southeast Asia was well behind Japan, both in terms of bank assets relative to GNP and per   15
capita assets.  Malaya was again apparently the most financially advanced Southeast Asian 
country but because no statistics for it exist until 1949 comparison is approximate.  A higher 
assets/GNP ratio in Japan than the United States reflects the large role of the banking system in 
Japanese financial development. 
IV. Long-term finance 
The banks established in Japan after 1870 were ill suited to the provision of long-term finance, 
but by, in effect, providing this were important to industrialisation.  It has been said that banks 
were 'decisive' in the development of the railway, cotton spinning, and silk reeling industries.
50  
But long-term finance in late nineteenth-century Japan also depended on the availability of stock 
markets and, crucially, on government support for the banks.  This section considers four issues.  
It first discusses stock market development in Japan and Southeast Asia.  Second, an analysis of 
railway finance shows the complementary relationship between the private sector and Meiji 
government.  Third, the Japanese government's establishment of institutions for long-term 
finance is considered.  Fourth, the section analyzes long-term finance in Southeast Asia. 
In 1878 stock exchanges, modeled on European markets, began in Tokyo and Osaka.  
The Tokyo Exchange, established to afford ex-samurai bondholders an outlet for their money, 
soon grew into the premier of a multiplicity (46 by 1898) of new exchanges set up, with 
government encouragement, throughout Japan.  In 1890 only 1% of Japan’s 4,300 joint stock 
companies were listed on the Tokyo Exchange.  But they were all ‘first rate big companies 
playing major roles in the new industrialisation’ and included representatives of the three main 
industries of railways, cotton spinning and electric power.
51  Between 1897 and 1911 market 
capitalisation of the Tokyo Exchange grew from ¥564 million to ¥2,095 million and 
considerably faster than GDP.  In 1912 the Japanese ratio of corporate stock to GDP of 0.41 
compared to 0.95 in the United States and 1.21 in the United Kingdom.
52  By contrast, even in 
the 1920s and 1930s local Southeast Asia exchanges were at best rudimentary.  These included   16
the Manila Stock Exchange, which traded mostly in mining shares, and the Rangoon Stock 
Exchange.  Only in the 1960s did equity markets began seriously to add to Southeast Asia's 
financial landscape.
53
Nineteenth century railway building in developing areas was typically financed through 
foreign investment, mainly from Britain.  Japan was at first no different: in 1870 the Meiji 
government borrowed in London for a railway linking Tokyo and the port of Yokohama.
54  But 
soon Meiji policy eschewed foreign borrowing.
55  Instead, government turned to private national 
finance and supported it strongly with state resources.  Private railway companies accounted for 
over two-thirds of the rail network of 7,725 kilometers by 1905, and 80% of their capital had 
been raised through stock issues.  Much of this capital came through effectively long-term 
finance from banks, both because of bank lending to finance the purchase of railway shares 
against these as collateral, and because of banks' substantial railway shareholdings.  Starting in 
1885 the Bank of Japan, contrary to its stated rules as a central bank, underwrote long-term bank 
finance for railways through advancing to banks against the collateral of railway shares. 
Finance for railway development was mobilized through a system of interconnected 
incentives.  The banks could attract funds by offering private depositors a comparatively safe 
fixed return, while railway shareowners, borrowing from banks to finance stock purchases, 
anticipated dividends above bank interest rates.  A dominance of 'dividend-seeking investors' 
insistent on the distribution of almost all railway company profits reflected their need to finance 
bank loans.
56  The Tokyo and Osaka stock exchanges afforded investors both liquidity and an 
institution through which, if railway stock appreciated, shares could be sold and a capital gain 
realized. 
The relationship forged around railway development in Japan was not just between 
railways and banks nor between railways and stock markets alone.  Rather there was a synergy 
between individual shareholders, the banks as lenders and as railway shareholders, stock   17
markets and the government.  Use by banks of short-term private deposits to finance long-term 
railway stock loans was risky.  Risk mounted as railway stock became a sizeable proportion of 
bank assets.
57  The Bank of Japan responded to an 1890 collapse in the value of railway stock by 
adding to the list of railway company shares it accepted as collateral and by enlarging for 
railway shares its ‘last resort’ or special discount system.  Until nationalization of the rail 
network in 1906, the Bank of Japan remained the ultimate bearer of railway stock collateral 
loans.
58  This role of government acting through the Bank of Japan — a relationship 
underplayed by Miwa and Ramseyer in their emphasis on the importance of stock markets — 
was crucial, not just to railways but also to other industries.
59  Through special discounting to 
banks, the Bank of Japan ‘could extend its support to securities markets, which would then 
inevitably come to rely heavily upon the Bank in the new century’.
60
Railway nationalization in 1906-7, effected by issuing public bonds in exchange for 
railway shares, freed and re-directed the large amount of private capital tied up in railways into 
other long-term investment.  Compensation for nationalization was paid at about twice railway 
construction costs.
61  The Meiji state used railway nationalization to substitute for private 
financial intermediation.  Funds that the government mobilized from a wider domestic and 
international public were put, as part of nationalization, in the hands of entrepreneurs likely to 
undertake productive, long-term investment.  Former railway shareholders who sold the 
nationalization bonds would not, the Finance Minister explained, use the money for 'eating and 
drinking sake.  I am sure they are bound to set up spinning and shipping companies in Japan or 
invest willingly in such enterprises in Manchuria and Korea'.
62  And, in fact, one-time Japanese 
railway capitalists, drawing on the highly liquid public bonds as capital and collateral, invested 
heavily in the iron and steel industry, light railways, tramways, and gas and electric power 
companies.  Among others, Mitsubishi 'profited enormously' from railway nationalization and 
used this capital injection to invest in shipbuilding and mining and branch into several new   18
industries.
63
One source of state funds for railway nationalization was a postal savings system set up 
by the government in 1875.  Like post office banks in United Kingdom-ruled Southeast Asian 
colonies, postal saving arrangements in Japan derived from Gladstone's British model.  But 
Meiji Japan, under Matsukata's urging, mandated that the postal savings 'concentrate funds from 
the hands of the people for modernization'.
64  Postal savings, in 1919 equivalent to 13% of total 
banking deposits, became for the government 'a huge, opaque pool for various policy lending 
purposes'.
65
The late nineteenth-century interrelationship between the Japanese state and a financial 
system which (the stock market apart) was not suited to long-term investment was an ingenious 
makeshift.  Meiji Japan recognized, however, the need for institutions specifically designed to 
provide long-term finance.  Special long-term credit, or mortgage, banks set up between 1897 
and 1902 to fill this gap were integral to Matsukata's policy of institutional specialization and 
constituted the last major component in Japan's achievement of financial transition by 1913.  
The two most important special bank initiatives were the Hypothec Bank of Japan (Nippon 
Kagyo Bank) organized in 1897 and a network of Agricultural and Industrial Banks.  The former 
imitated France's Crédit Foncier while the Industrial Bank of Japan was modeled on the Crédit 
Mobilier.  Like commercial banking in the 1870s and 1880s, the special banks relied 
substantially on an infant industry strategy of incentives and subsidies.  The government 
guaranteed private investors purchasing stock in the new banks a dividend of 5% for ten years; 
controlled the banks' policy through the Ministry of Finance; and, using the pool of postal 
savings, absorbed a substantial part of the debenture issues which were the main source of the 
banks' capital.
66  
In Southeast Asia the provision of long-term finance varied between countries and 
followed the banking tradition of the ruling metropolitan power.  Throughout the region long-  19
term institutional finance for Asians, though not for Europeans, was virtually unavailable, even 
for primary commodity production or for agricultural improvements.  Financial dualism of this 
kind, and an only patchy availability of long-term finance, reveal pre-World War II Southeast 
Asia as well short of financial transition. 
Southeast Asian natural resource abundance shaped both economic and financial 
structure.  In small primary production-oriented economies like Southeast Asia’s, rich natural 
resources and a lack of domestic market scale economies typically work together to delay 
industrialization, perhaps for lengthy periods.
67  Factor endowments in Southeast Asia of 
abundant resources and virtually unlimited cheap labour, available through immigration from 
India and China and the traditional sectors of dual economies, made it efficient for small 
producers using only simple tools and traditional techniques to expand onto new land and 
continuously reproduce an earlier pattern of development.  Until 1910 this was close to the sole 
method of expansion in vent-for-surplus agriculture and in Malayan tin mining.  Such export 
expansion required little more than circulating or wage fund capital and was largely self-
financing.
68  Export expansion like Southeast Asia’s, dependent chiefly on capital widening, 
sharply limited both the need for finance and pressure for financial innovation. 
Southeast Asia differed fundamentally from Japan in that the financial institutions which 
did develop to facilitate long-term investment in primary production — the agency houses 
together with agricultural banks in Indonesia — served almost exclusively European enterprise 
and looked to metropolitan markets, especially London, as sources of capital.  Thus, in Malaya, 
Asian entrepreneurs, mostly Chinese, who required loans to develop rubber estates, relied on 
'very limited amounts' from European banks against security like house mortgages; credit came 
chiefly from storekeepers and Chettiar moneylenders.
69  McKinnon terms the exclusion of 
Asians from formal finance 'financial repression': 'rubber estates in the Far East were developed 
by Europeans with overseas banking connections and access to direct finance ...   20
Entrepreneurship in the indigenous economy was allowed to languish without significant 
financial support'.
70
V. Rural finance 
A developed financial system links urban and rural economic sectors.  It raises productivity by 
transferring resources to higher yielding projects both within and between these sectors and, at 
the same time, through the transfer mechanism of financial intermediaries, contributes to the 
elimination of a dual economy.  This section analyzes rural finance and the emergence of rural-
urban financial linkages in Japan and Southeast Asia. 
In Japan in 1885 only about 7% of agricultural borrowings were from modern financial 
institutions, but by 1910 this proportion had risen to over a third and in 1932 to more than two 
fifths.
71  Although this still left a large and vibrant informal rural financial sector, an ongoing 
process of financial unification was evident.  Comparable statistics do not exist for Southeast 
Asia.  It is clear, however, that few Asian farmers came in direct contact with modern finance. 
  Three reasons for differential rural financial development in Japan and Southeast Asia 
can be identified.  One was that intersectoral financial linkages grew in Japan but only to a 
limited extent in Southeast Asia.  In late nineteenth-century Japan, supply leading policies which 
made banking profitable led to an increase in the number of banks and branches such that by 
1901 banking reached 'virtually every town'.
72  Agriculture could draw extensively on bank 
finance, especially for the commercial crops of silk, tea and rice.
73  Furthermore, the Nippon 
Kagyo Bank, along with its prefecture affiliates, actively financed agricultural improvements.  
Until 1900, agriculture was a net borrower from the banking system and the former rural elite 
net lenders to the banks.
74  After the turn of the century, closely integrated Japanese rural and 
urban finance promoted structural change and economic growth through the transfer of 
agricultural surpluses to the industrial sector. 
  No rural banking network comparable to Japan's developed in Southeast Asia.  European   21
and local Asian banks remained concentrated in the main port cities.  Local Asian banks, unlike 
the region's cultivators, were mainly ethnic Chinese and, furthermore, too newly established 
seriously to consider extending operations to rural areas.  Dawson's Bank in Burma, with its 
head office in Pyapon and eight branches by 1929, was the principal instance of a European-
owned bank in rural Southeast Asia.
75
  Second, there was a clear divergence between Japanese and Southeast Asia governments 
in their approach to rural finance.  Until around 1900 the Japanese government's attitude towards 
financial provision in rural areas was laissez-faire.
76  In 1900, however, the Industrial 
Cooperatives Law led to the reorganization of existing cooperatives and the formation of many 
new ones to provide credit.  Amendments to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank Law allowed 
up to five-year loans from the Agricultural and Industrial Banks to credit cooperatives.  
Furthermore, they could draw liberally on funds from the government's Deposit Bureau, which 
itself mainly tapped the postal saving system.  Credit cooperatives grew rapidly until 1917, by 
which time deposits first began to exceed lendings.
77
As in pre-1900 Japan, governments in Southeast Asia were little, if at all, involved in 
rural financial provision.
78 That changed in the twentieth century as part of a growing interest in 
Asian welfare.  But Southeast Asian governments, not driven by the strong political agenda of 
nationalist and modernization goals of the Japanese state, generally promoted cooperatives with 
far less enthusiasm, and certainly with fewer resources, than in Japan. 
Third, differences in geographical and social settings help to explain contrasting 
Japanese and Southeast Asian rural finance.  Government involvement, as in Japan, can help to 
establish rural cooperatives, but these ultimately depend on social organization, commitment and 
cultural attitudes.  Plural societies and the frontier character of Southeast Asia's vent-for-surplus 
areas militated against cooperation.  In Thailand's rice export areas, for example, many families 
made several moves in a lifetime; peasants 'who felt overwhelmed by debt dues and tax arrears   22
disappeared in the middle of the night and sought out new land'.
79  An exception was Java, 
where more settled communities and economies of scale associated with high population density 
created, as in Japan, characteristics consistent with an ethos of cooperation and with institutional 
finance achieving cost effectiveness.  The Dutch built on these advantages with substantial 
efforts to establish credit facilities through networks of regulated pawnshops and village banks.
80  
But in 1939 in Southeast Asia as a whole, including Indonesia's Outer Provinces, Asian 
cultivators continued to rely almost entirely on informal finance from such sources as village 
storekeepers, moneylenders and rotating saving and credit associations. 
VI. Findings and Discussion 
Financial transition in capitalist economies tends to divide into two phases.  In an initial period, 
effective institutions are established, chiefly a unified reliable monetary standard, a critical mass 
of commercial banks, a central bank or its equivalent, and efficient fiscal arrangements.  This 
first stage corresponds to what Sylla terms 'financial revolution'.
81  In England this revolutionary 
phase occurred from about 1680 and 1720 and in the United States, with a remarkable burst 
under Alexander Hamilton when he was Treasury Secretary from 1789 to 1795.  Extraordinarily 
rapid United States' financial development continued through 1825.
82
During the second period, substantial qualitative and quantitative change takes place.  In 
part, this involves the maturing of existing institutions, and in part the emergence of a more 
varied range of financial intermediaries, especially those providing some form of long-term 
finance.  Reflecting these changes, a country's financial system acquires depth.  Financial assets 
increase relative to GNP, and M2 rises relative to both M0 and M1.  In England, as Sylla shows, 
a modern financial system emerged 'sometime in the nineteenth century'.
83  This second phase in 
the United States, though held up by a Jeffersonian-Jacksonian political agenda, was perhaps 
shorter than in England but probably not fully accomplished until the 1880s.  By the end of the 
second period, the financial structure resembles that of a developed country.   23
  Judged by this taxonomy, in Japan the years 1868 to 1885 correspond to the first stage of 
financial transition.  By the end of the period Japan had a uniform currency based on the yen.  A 
network of commercial banks, started largely in response to government fiscal incentives, 
operated.  Beginning in 1886 the Bank of Japan functioned as a central bank.  A strong fiscal 
system, dependent on state taxation of rice production, was an early priority of the Meiji 
government and essential to completion of the first stage of transition in Japan. 
  The second phase of Japan's financial transition corresponded in its inception in 1886 to 
the start of modern economic growth and ended in 1913.  During this same period Japan 
assumed the features of a modern state.  In the course of financial transition, commercial banks 
were unified into a single system with the expiry of the national bank licenses.  Short-term credit 
became freely available.  It was complemented by the rise of the Tokyo and Osaka stock 
markets and new long-term credit banks for agriculture and industry organized by the 
government between 1897 and 1902.  Through the Bank of Japan the government achieved 
great influence over both commercial banks and the long-term credit banks which it partly 
owned.  Adoption of the gold standard in 1897 enhanced Japan's scope to borrow 
internationally.  Finance for the Russo-Japanese War expanded Japan's new financial 
infrastructure through extensive external and internal borrowing.  Consistent with the timing of 
phases identified by Sylla, Goldsmith emphasizes that in just over five decades ending in 1913, 
Japan acquired a financial structure 'qualitatively and quantitatively not too dissimilar from … 
those built up in contemporary Western countries in about twice to three times that time span'.
84
  Applying the two-stage taxonomy of financial transition to Southeast Asian countries, in 
1939 even the most advanced had yet fully to complete the first stage and in important respects 
still fell short of the Japanese position of 1885.  The establishment of uniform monetary 
standards, for the most part after 1900, was accomplished at the expense of an elastic money 
supply which could promote economic development.  Financial institutions either were   24
European-oriented or faced systemic uncertainty.  The gold-exchange standard and currency 
board system exacerbated instability already present in the region's economies because of their 
dependence on a few export staples, and hindered the growth of local Asian banks.  European 
exchange banks, interested mainly in financing foreign trade, dominated commercial banking.  
Unlike banks in Japan, which spread through the country, the exchange banks concentrated in 
the larger port cities.  Long-term institutional finance for agriculture existed in various forms but 
served almost exclusively the European community.  Financial repression in McKinnon's sense 
of a dual financial structure predominated.  In 1939, rural areas and all but a few Asians still 
relied on a pre-modern financial structure of moneylenders, storekeepers and the like. 
 Four  main  considerations  account for the differing speeds of financial transition in 
Southeast Asia and Japan.  First, different man/land ratios and divergent natural resource bases 
influenced the speed of financial transition.  As was true of Southeast Asia, ‘[F]inance’, John 
Gurley remarks, ‘is often handicapped by the narrow range of primary securities which emanate 
from equally narrow economic structures — one-crop economics, etc.’
85  In Southeast Asia's 
vent-for-surplus economies, abundant natural resources substituted for capital mobilized through 
financial institutions as an input to economic growth.  Pressure for change in Southeast Asian 
countries was limited by a continued ability to tap natural resources, and attain generally 
acceptable economic growth levels without substantial changes in the technologies either of 
growing agriculture staples or of finance.  The capacity of Southeast Asia's economies to 
achieve economic growth with relatively little state interference suited the predominantly liberal 
preferences of the region's colonial governments for free trade and recourse to the market.  
Financial development in Japan, by contrast, bears out Gerschenkron's predictions for 
latecomers: that some form of modern financial system is acquired at an accelerated pace; that 
government often takes the initiative in instigating this; and that the country borrows foreign 
techniques, as Japan so liberally did when setting up its financial institutions.
86  25
  Second, in Japan, much more than in Southeast Asia, continuous technological 
innovation and movement towards large-scale production created important new outlets for 
finance and investment.  Principal objects for finance in pre-Meiji Japan were 'the deficits of 
aristocratic and rural overspenders, not exactly the right basis for a financial system linked to 
sustained economic growth'.
87  Financial transition and modern economic growth go together 
because the technological basis of the latter creates major new opportunities for finance and the 
emergence of financial intermediaries.  Investment opportunities thrown up by technological 
change encourage saving by creating a demand from entrepreneurs for finance and by raising 
returns available to savers.  If the state, as in pre-Second World War Japan, promotes 
technological development through industrial policy and military activities, it also encourages 
financial development, even when not itself financing new projects. 
A third reason, related to the first two, for relatively little financial development in 
Southeast Asia is that financing methods depend crucially on the distribution and nature of 
capital formation.  Throughout rural Southeast Asia the role of formal finance was limited 
because, even with the spread after 1910 of European-owned estates able to draw on bank credit, 
exports still relied mainly on small, family-based production units.  Although Meiji economic 
growth resembled Southeast Asia's in a dependence on small farmers, Japanese agriculture drew 
much more than Southeast Asian on funds from other sectors with a consequent expansion of 
the financial superstructure.  And, unlike in Southeast Asia, there was considerable structural 
change in Japan's economy with the spread of modern industry and railways financed largely by 
domestic borrowing which required modern financial institutions.  To a substantial extent the 
Japanese government, motivated by nationalism and a perceived threat of foreign domination, 
pushed forward the development of financial institutions ahead of demand, encapsulated in 
Patrick's concept of supply-leading finance.
88  26
Accordingly, political considerations are the fourth, and most important, explanation for 
the differing speeds of financial transition.  Although not citing Japan, Ferguson emphasizes the 
central role of politics in the emergence of modern financial systems.
89  Financial modernity is 
fundamental to the creation of a modern state and to the political aims of enhancing military 
capabilities and expansionary nationalism.  Realizing these aims, in turn, builds financial 
capacity. The financing of war, by drawing on a nation's financial infrastructure, expands it.  
Japan between 1868 and 1939 easily fits such a model.  Japanese financial development cannot 
be understood other than as part of a politically inspired drive to modernisation and 
industrialisation. 
Men do not make history independent of existing forces, and I have argued that in late-
nineteenth century Southeast Asia the absence of an effective political nationalism made 
financial transition highly unlikely.  Even given a more advanced financial structure, it seems 
doubtful that Southeast Asia could have progressed too much further towards modern economic 
growth than it did: in Southeast Asia the restrictive features of colonialism worked against both 
economic development and financial transition.  Financial development requires a permissive 
social and economic base, and is much helped, as Sylla observes, if not by war at least by some 
similar peacetime stimulus.
90  There was, in pre-World War II Southeast Asia, no possibility of 
strongly government-led financial development like that in Singapore beginning in the 1970s.
91
Some forms of colonial rule, as post-World War II Hong Kong shows, may be not 
merely compatible with financial development but aid it by ensuring stability and the rule of 
law.  In pre-World War II Southeast Asia, however, colonialism probably significantly retarded 
financial development.  The political disadvantages associated with colonial status in Southeast 
Asia made financial transition difficult.  Colonial governments eschewed the mass participation 
and political integration of the modern state, as well as lacking its freedom to take political 
decisions.  One of the principal lessons to be learnt from Japan is that financial transition can be   27
accelerated; another, that a decision to do so is essentially political.  If instead of emerging from 
semi-colonial status Japan had been colonized, its progress towards financial transition might 
have been much closer to Southeast Asia's. 
From the perspective of Southeast Asia in 1929, and in light of comparatively high per 
capita incomes there over the previous 60 years, it might have appeared that Goldsmith was 
wrong in indicating a 'rough parallelism' between financial and economic development, and in 
maintaining that all countries follow a broadly similar path of financial transition.  But by the 
post-World War II period when Southeast Asia gained independence, the relevance of Japanese 
financial transition between 1868 and 1913 was fully apparent.  Japan's experience shows how 
transitions to financial development, modern economic growth and a modern state are, if not in 
any rigid causal relationship, part of a complementary process of political, economic and social 
change.  After the Second World War, for Southeast Asia to continue to grow economically its 
constituent countries had to move from earlier natural-resource based, vent-for-surplus growth to 
follow Japan's example of multiple transitions.  Significantly, Singapore and Malaysia, the 
closest to Japan at the end of the 1920s, were the first to do so.  
Table 1 
Southeast Asian and Japan Per Capita GDP, 1870-1938 
 
 (a) GDP per capita (1990 international dollars) 
  1870 1913 1929 1938 
 
Burma  504 685 902 740 
Thailand  712 841 793 826 
Malaya 665    950  1,787  1,446 
Indonesia 654  904  1,170  1,175 
Philippines 776    1,053  1,502  1,522 
Japan  737 1,387 2,026 2,449 
United  States  2,445 5,301 6,899 6,126   
 
(b) GDP per capita (current Japanese yen) 
 1913  1922  1938 
 
 
Malaya 179  526  501 
Indonesia 105  154  160 
Philippines     241 
Vietnam, South  123  134  124 
Japan 98  271  377 
 
Notes: 
1.   In panel (c) the 1929 figure for Burma refers to 1931. 
2.  Malaya refers to the Malay Peninsula and Singapore, Penang and Malacca.  Figures are the population weighted 
per capita incomes from Maddison.  For 1929 and 1938 Maddison does not have estimates for Singapore.  It is 
assumed that Singapore grew at the same rates as Malaysia (the Malay Peninsula and Penang). 
 
Sources: A. Maddison , The world economy: historical statistics (Paris, 2003), pp. 87, 180-83; J-P. Bassino and P. 
van der Eng, ' Economic divergence in East Asia: new benchmark estimates of levels of wages and GDP, 1913 1970' 
processed, 2002), p. 12.
  28Table 2 
Southeast Asia, Japan and the United States: Measures of Money Supply, 1885-1938 
 
 
(a) Ratio of commercial bank demand deposits to M0 (D/M0) and M0 per capita (1913 US$) 
 1913  1929      1938 
 
 D/M0  M0  D/MO  M0  D/M0  M0 
   per    per    per 
   capita    capita    capita 
 
Burma -  -  -  -  0.34  6.23 
Indochina -  1.45  -  3.73  -  3.22 
Thailand -  4.72  -  5.84  0.29  6.05 
Malaya -  9.19  -  12.16  1.02  18.89 
Indonesia 0.22  2.24  0.34  3.52  0.56  3.79 
Philippines 0.30  2.75 0.49  4.42 0.36  10.10 
Japan 1.56  6.13  2.32  8.93  2.10  7.66 
United States  5.13  19.33  5.84  18.80  4.47  28.86 
 
(b)  Ratios of monetary aggregates to GDP 





























US  0.11  0.22  0.13  0.32  0.09  0.33  0.45 
Japan  0.22 0.25 0.25 0.13 0.29 0.35 0.13 0.22 0.49 
 
(c) Ratios of monetary aggregates to GDP 
 1913  1929  1938 
 
  M0/ M1/  M0/ M1/  M0/ M1/ M2/ 
  GDP GDP  GDP GDP  GDP GDP GDP 
 
Burma  0.07 -  0.27 -  0.18  0.24  0.29 
Indochina  - -  - -  - - - 
Thailand  0.08 -  0.10 -  0.05  0.07  0.07 
Malaya  0.06 -  0.05 -  0.09  0.18  0.23 
Indonesia  0.08 0.09  0.09 0.12  0.08 0.12  - 
Philippines  0.06 0.08  0.07 0.10  0.12 0.17 0.21 
Japan  0.13 0.22  0.13 0.43  0.13 0.40 0.79 
US  0.09 0.33  0.07 0.29  0.17 0.46 0.64 
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Notes and Sources: Money supply and money supply deflators: Money supply: Base money supply or the 
monetary base (M0) is defined as the sum of currency held by the public and currency held by banks as vault cash.  
The article distinguishes between M1, which is M0 plus demand or sight (checking) deposits with commercial 
banks; and M2 which also includes time deposits (fixed term and savings accounts).  Sources for money supply 
statistics are: Burma: Tun Wai, Burma's currency, p. 114.  The figures for 1938 are for 1938/39.  Indochina: 
Annuaire Statistique 1913 a 1922, p. 157, 1943-1944, p. 287. Thailand: Kingdom of Thailand, Department of 
Commerce and Statistics, Statistical year book of the Kingdom of Siam [or Thailand], (Bangkok), 1920, p. 127, 
1933-35, p. 353, 1937-38 and 1938-39, p. 331; B. R. Shenoy, 'The currency, banking, and exchange system in 
Thailand', IMF Staff Papers (1950), pp. 292, 295.  Figures for M0 are for the fiscal year beginning the year given in 
the table, e.g. 1913-14 for 1913.  For 1938 figures are for December 1939. Malaya: Straits Settlements, 'Working of 
the currency department', Straits Settlements annual reports, 1912-1937 (Singapore); Straits Settlements, 'Working   30
of the Malayan Currency Commission', Straits Settlements Annual Report, II, 1938 (Singapore, 1939).  For 1938 
demand and time deposits are estimated by assuming that these were in the same ratios to M0 (1.02 and 0.52) as for 
31 December 1955.  Demand and time deposits for 1955 are from Bank of England Archives, OV 65/10, 'Banking 
statistics'.  These estimates probably constitute an upper bound for M1 and M2 in 1938. Indonesia: J. T. M. van 
Laanen, Money and Banking, 1816-1940, published as Vol.6, Changing Economy in Indonesia (The Hague, 1980), 
pp. 71-77, lines 16, 22. Philippines: Philippines, Department of Finance, Annual Report of the Treasurer of the 
Philippine Islands (Manila) 1913, p. 13; 1920, p. 41, 1930, p. 117, 1939, p. 110; Philippines, Annual Report of the 
Bank Commissioner of the Philippine Islands (Manila), 1929, p. 8, 1938, p. 17.  For 1913 demand deposits includes 
the categories current accounts and demand deposits.  Of these, current accounts was very much the larger and may 
not strictly have constituted demand deposits.  Japan: K. Asakura and C. Nishiyama (eds.), Nihon Keizai no 
Kaheiteki Bunseki [A Monetary Analysis and History of the Japanese Economy] (Tokyo, 1974), p. 823. United 
States: Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary history, pp. 708-15.  Figures are the averages of the monthly averages.  
For 1913 the figures are for 1914 and the figure for demand deposits for the seven months beginning June. 
Deflators:  Money supply for Southeast Asia was deflated to 1913 prices with the index derived from the reflator in 
van der Eng, Indonesian National Income except Thailand for which the deflator in M. Sompop, Economic 
development of Thailand, 1850-1950 (Groningen, 1989), p. 251 was used.  These two indices agree closely with 
each other and with Lewis' tropical commodities index.  For Japan and the United States the same deflator as for 
GDP was used for money supply. For Japan this was the consumer price index from Goldsmith, Financial 
development of Japan, pp. 73, 110; and for the United States the GNP implicit price index from U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Historical, part 1, p. 224. Gross domestic product: Burma: A. Hlaing, 'Trends of economic growth 
and income distribution in Burma, 1870-1940', Journal of the Burma Research Society, 47 (1964), p. 143.  Figures 
are for Net National Product.  For 1913 the figure is for 1911/12 and for 1929 it is for 1926/27. Thailand: Sompop, 
Economic development, p. 251. Malaya: van der Eng, Historical Estimates.  These estimates for Peninsular Malaya 
exclude Singapore and are in 1960 Straits dollars.  GDP to include Singapore is estimated by assuming that 
Singapore's GDP was 39.6% of Peninsular Malaya's (the proportion in 1956) and reflating using the price 
relationships in W. A. Lewis, Aspects of tropical trade, 1883-1965 (Stockholm, 1969), pp. 49-50.  GDP for 
Singapore in 1956 is from Oshima, 'Growth', p. 49, and for Peninsular Malaya from C-Y. Lim, Economic 
development of modern Malaya (Kuala Lumpur, 1967), p. 317. Indonesia: van der Eng, Indonesian National 
Income. Philippines: R. Hooley, 'American economic policy in the Philippines, 1902-1940: exploring a dark age in 
colonial statistics', Journal of Asian Economics 16 (2005), pp. 480-81. Japan: Ohkawa and Sinohara, Patterns, pp. 
267-69. Figures are for GNP. United States: United States, U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical statistics of 





Southeast Asia, Japan and the United States: commercial bank assets, 1938 
 
  Assets as % of GDP  Assets per capita US$ 
Burma  0.08    2.49 
Thailand  0.06     5.09 
Malaya 0.28    52.82 
Philippines 0.08    12.23 
Japan  1.03  123.72 
United States  0.66  432.41 
 
Notes and Sources: As for table 2 and Burma: Tun Wai, Burma's currency, p. 195. Thailand: Shenoy, 'Currency', 
p. 295. Malaya: Bank of England Archives OV65/10, 'Banking statistics' and for GNP International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, The economic development of Malaya (Washington, DC, 1955), p. 509.  Figures 
refer to 1949. Philippines: Philippines, Bureau of the Census and Statistics, Yearbook of Philippine statistics 1940. 
(Manila, 1941), p. 169. Japan: Goldsmith, Financial development of Japan, p. 54. Figures refer to 1940. United 
States: Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary history, p. 450. Exchange Rates: P. van der Eng, The silver standard and 
Asia's integration into the world economy (Canberra: Australian National University, Department of Economic 
History, working paper no.175, 1993), pp. 28-29.    31
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